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22 September 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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*Congo: The provisional cease-fire in Katanga apparently was observed for the most part by both sides yesterday, although UN officials were pessimistic on the question of how long the cease-fire would last. Only a few incidents of sniper firing were reported in Elisabethville, but Tshombé complained to the UN about the continuing actions by UN forces in Albertville, including "many arrests" made there yesterday morning despite the cease-fire agreement. *AK*

Tshombé has been informed by UN representative Khiari that the UN plans to bring jet aircraft into the Congo, a move Tshombé might regard as a violation of the cease-fire provisions. According to a broadcast from "Radio Katanga" on 21 September, Tshombé has put forth two additional conditions for a "definite" cease-fire. He has demanded the departure of all UN troops from Katanga and has asked compensation for all damage caused by UN troops.

According to press reports, the central government is contemplating a requisition of Air Congo aircraft for an airlift to Katanga.

The situation in Elisabethville remains potentially explosive. There has been a serious food shortage among the some 30,000

anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen settled by the UN on the outskirts of Elisabethville. On 20 September, bands of Baluba refugees left the camps and attacked both whites and Africans. The US consul in Elisabethville, in reporting yesterday the killing of a Belgian farmer the night of 20-21 September, saw a danger that Belgians might resort to reprisals against the Balubas, thereby touching off renewed violence. UN officials have characterized the Balubas as a "critical and dangerous threat to Europeans of any nationality" should they run wild.

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 15 August through 19 September 1961:

1. Soviet statements over the past two weeks and the agreement to talk with the US in New York suggest that Khrushchev has not foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated settlement as an alternative to proceeding with a separate treaty by the end of the year. The Soviets, however, have rigidly adhered to their stated terms--a German peace treaty and a "free city"--as the framework for negotiations. Repeated Soviet and satellite statements reaffirming the year-end deadline for a peace treaty indicate that the Soviets hope to step up the pace of diplomatic exchanges. The Soviets apparently would prefer a Western initiative to convene formal negotiations at an early date, but failing this they will probably try to exploit the UN session to put pressure on the West to negotiate. *ns*

2. As part of their general tactics of intimidation and pressure against the West, the Soviets have made diplomatic threats against civil air traffic to Berlin. Some limited harassments, similar to those in the past, appear likely, but will probably stop short of forcible action against air access prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

3. Within East Germany popular dissatisfaction--particularly among the youth--remains widespread and continues to be exhibited in a variety of minor antiregime incidents which became more frequent as the 17 September election approached. Refugee escapes to West Berlin and West Germany are at a total rate of 20 to 30 a day. The regime shows concern about the latent discontent and continues to move vigorously and ruthlessly to maintain control over the population. While self-confidence

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is displayed at the top level of the party, lower echelon party workers seem nervous, overworked, and edgy. Strikes, passive resistance, and even severe local demonstrations remain possible, but the regime presently is prepared to take whatever actions are necessary to prevent serious popular outbursts.

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Laos: Ambassador Harriman comments that in his 19 September meeting with Phoumi in Vientiane, he gained the strong impression that Phoumi has no real intention of pursuing serious negotiations with the opposing side. Phoumi insisted that thus far he had made all the concessions and the other side none. He argued that Souvanna had come too much under the Communist thumb to be trusted. Phoumi also told Harriman that he did not rule out the possibility of a three-princes' meeting at Ban Hin Heup, as suggested by Souvanna, although he still thought Luang Prabang the proper venue.

The Vientiane government is stating publicly that Souvanna, in his recent talks with Harriman in Rangoon, failed to remove doubts concerning his claim to be a "true neutral." Vientiane's hostility toward Souvanna was also shown in the omission of his name from a list of possible candidates for the premiership presented by the government delegations at the 20 September Namone meeting. At this same meeting the government delegation rejected Souvanna's proposal of Ban Hin Heup for new high-level talks and instead insisted on Luang Prabang.

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Netherlands-Indonesia: Dutch representatives are continuing to maintain semi-official contacts with President Sukarno and other Indonesian officials in an effort to promote a solution to the dispute over West New Guinea. [In a discussion with Ambassador Stevenson in New York recently, Sukarno stated that emissaries of the governing Catholic People's party as well as the opposition Labor party in the Netherlands had met with him in Vienna on a personal basis to find a face-saving means "to turn New Guinea over to Indonesia." In response to growing

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[redacted] pressure at home for a new approach to this problem, the Dutch Government may raise the West New Guinea issue in the current session of the UN General Assembly. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

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Dutch-Indonesian Dispute Over West New Guinea

Faced with the possibility of Indonesia's undertaking military operations to secure the disputed territory, important segments of the Dutch public as well as much of the press are increasingly dissatisfied with the government's rigid insistence on its policy of preparing the approximately 700,000 Papuans for self-determination. Under this policy, the government envisages a period of political tutelage--perhaps 10 or 12 years--after which the Papuans presumably would be prepared to decide whether they wish to become independent, join Indonesia, or participate in a Melanesian federation which would include Pacific islands northeast of Australia.

Since there is little likelihood that Indonesia will accept a settlement on this basis, Foreign Minister Luns, who is identified with the group favoring a "hard line" in the dispute, may propose some form of UN action during the current session of the General Assembly. According to a leading Dutch daily, Luns may suggest that a UN commission visit New Guinea to observe the situation there. The Dutch are also reported to be considering a proposal for UN trusteeship over the area until the natives are competent to choose their own future.

Those groups in the Netherlands which have been most active in urging a new approach to the problem--business interests and the socialist and liberal press--are inclined to doubt that these proposals will succeed, and instead favor bilateral talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Implicit in this position is the hope for re-establishment of diplomatic relations, severed by Indonesia in 1960. These groups advocate at least tacit recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea in return for an Indonesian guarantee to provide the Papuans with a special status or give them a subsequent opportunity to express their own wishes.

The US Embassy in The Hague believes that despite strong parliamentary opposition to any proposal which waters down

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the principle of self-determination, the Dutch Government could now perhaps accept a solution along these general lines with less controversy than at any time in the past.

Djakarta has indicated that it is willing to accept a trusteeship of brief duration provided there was an advance guarantee of the area's transfer to Indonesia. The government takes the position that the only basis for settlement of the West New Guinea question is the "return" of the territory to Indonesia.

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